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certain,31 it would seem likely that it will not be the final determination
in the expansion of section 16 (b).
DONALD GARY OWENS
Domestic Relations-THE EFFECT OF MENTAL INCOMPETENCE IN
DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS. Crittenden v. Crittenden, 210 Va. 76, 168 S.E.2d
115 (1969).
For more than two years Henry Crittenden had been separated from
his wife as a result of her commitment for mental incompetence.' This
separation was the grounds for which a Chancery court decree awarded
Mr. Crittenden a divorce a vinculo matrimonii.2 Evelyn Crittenden and
her committee appealed.3
In reversing the chancery court, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia held that for separation to be a ground for divorce under
section 20-91(9) of the Virginia Code, the parties must be sufficiently
competent to be cognizant of the separation.4 One separated from his
spouse as a result of commitment for mental incompetence is not, as a
matter of law, capable of being conscious that a separation has occurred.5
In the absence of statute, the fact that a husband and wife live
separate and apart, regardless of the length of time, is not a ground for
divorce.6 Approximately one half of the jurisdictions in the United
shall occur within 6 months after any change in this beneficial ownership
of such securities prior to such date. The statement on Form 4 shall be
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change in beneficial ownership occurs.
By this new rule, Feder type transactions are reportable under 16(a) and, therefore,
subject by statute to section 16 (b).
31. A petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court has been filed. 37 U.S.L.W. 3452
(U.S. May 16, 1969) (No. 1404, 1968-69 Term; renumbered No. 125, 1969-70 Term).
1. Crittenden v. Crittenden, 210 Va. 76, 168 S.E.2d 115 (1969). Evelyn Crittenden
had been committed to Eastern State Hospital, Williamsburg, Virginia, on May 19,
1950, and was still confined at the time of this decision. Id. at 77, 168 S.E.2d at 115.
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9) (Cumulative Supp. 1968):
A Divorce from the bond of matrimony may be decreed:
(9) On the application of either party if and when the husband and wife
have lived separate and apart without any cohabitation and without inter-
ruption for two years. A plea of res adjudicata or of recrimination with
respect to any other provision of this section shall not be a bar to either
party obtaining a divorce on this ground.
3. 210 Va. at 77, 168 S.E.2d at 116.
4. Id. at 78, 168 S.E.2d at 116.
5. Id.
6. E.g., McDougall v. McDougall, 5 Wash. 802, 803, 32 P. 749, 750 (1893).
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States, however, have statutes which recognize separation as a distinct
ground for divorce. 7 The rationale for providing separation as a ground
is that when the parties have lived apart for a long period of time, with-
out any intention of reconciliation, it is in the best interests of the
parties and society that the marriage be dissolved. 8 The leading Virginia
case of Canavos v. Canavos, in accepting this rationale, held that the
ground of separation is available to either spouse, regardless of fault.'
The holding in Canavos is supported by a majority of courts,10 but a
minority view holds that a person cannot be granted a divorce for a
ground which is solely the result of his own wrong."
The effect of insanity upon the ground of separation has lead to a
variance of opinion. The view supported by most states is that the parties
7. AL-. CODE tit. 34, § 22(1) (Supp. 1967); Aaiz. REv. STAT. AN'N. § 25-312(7) (1956);
AIL STAT. ANN. § 34-1202(7) (1962); COLO. REv. STAT. ch. 46-1-1(j) (1963); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 1522(11) (Supp. 1968); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-904(a) (1961); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 32-610 (1963); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.020(H) (1963); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:301 (1950); MD. CODE ANN. art. 16, § 24 (1966); MANN. STAT. ANN. § 518.06(8)
(1969); NEV. REv. STAT. tit. 10, § 125.010(9) (1957); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 458:7
(X-XI) (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1966); N.D. REv. CODE tit. 14, § 14-06-05
(1943); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-3 (1956); Tx. REv. Crvm STAT. art. 4629(4) (Supp.
1968); UTAH CODE AwN. tit. 30-3-1(8) (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551(7) (1958);
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9) (Cumulative Supp. 1968); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. tit. 26,
§ 26.08.020(9) (Supp. 1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. ch. 48, § 48-2-4(7) (Supp. 1969);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.07(7) (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 20-47 (1957). See
generally Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Witbout Perjury, 52 VA. L. REv. 32,
52 (1966); 18 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 157 (1961).
8. See, e.g., Barrington v. Barrington, 206 Ala. 192, 193, 89 So. 512, 513 (1921);
Rozboril v. Rozboril, 60 Ariz. 247, 249, 135 P.2d 221, 223 (1943); Finnegan v. Finnegan,
76 Idaho 500, 503, 285 P.2d 488, 491 (1955); Otis v. Bahan, 209 La. 1082, 1084, 26
So. 2d 146, 148 (1946); George v. George, 56 Nev. 12, 13, 41 P.2d 1059, 1060 (1935);
Dawson v. Dawson, 62 Wyo. 519, 521, 177 P.2d 200, 202 (1947); Jegendorf v. Jegendorf,
61 Wyo. 277, 279, 157 P. 2d 280, 282 (1945). See F. KEEzER, MARAcE & DrvoRcE 455
(3d ed. 1946).
9. 205 Va. 744, 747, 139 SE.2d 825, 827 (1965).
10. E.g., Parks v. Parks, 116 F.2d 556, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Barrington v. Barrington,
206 Ala. 192, 193, 89 So. 512, 513 (1921); Rozboril v. Rozboril, 60 Ariz. 247, 249, 135
P.2d 221, 223 (1943); Young v. Young, 207 Ark. 36, 38, 178 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1944);
Wilson v. Wilson, 81 Idaho 375, 377, 341 P.2d 894, 896 (1959); Colston v. Colston,
297 Ky. 250, 251, 179 S.W.2d 893, 894 (1944); Roy v. Florane, 239 La. 749, 752, 119 So.2d
849, 852 (1960); Matysek v. Matysek, 212 Md. 44, 128 A.2d 627 (1957); Pearson v.
Pearson, 77 Nev. 76, 77, 359 P.2d 386, 387 (1961); Fields v. Fields, 399 S.W.2d 958, 959
(Tex. Civ. App. 1966). See Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 502 (1967).
1I. E.g., Pierce v. Pierce, 120 Wash. 411, 413, 208 P. 49, 51 (1922). Also, under a
statute requiring that the separation be by mutual agreement, a divorce would not be
granted where the separation was caused by the fault of one party against the will of
the other. Willcox v. Willcox, 209 A2d 166, 168 (Del. Sup. Cr. 1965); Powless v.
Powless, 269 Wis. 552, 553, 69 N.W.2d 753, 754 (1955).
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must have been separated for the statutory period while they were
mentally competent. 12 The fact that an insane spouse is incapable of a
voluntary act of separation 13 and that the courts will refrain from in-
directly making insanity a part of this ground for divorce provide the
basis for this view.14 The opposing view reasons that the right to
divorce accrues immediately upon separation and is perfected upon the
expiration of the required time period, notwithstanding that the other
spouse was insane during that time. 5
In most jurisdictions insanity is generally a defense to a divorce action
on any ground, 6 and Crittenden, following the prevailing view, estab-
lishes that separation as a result of insanity is not a valid ground for
divorce in Virginia as well. Thus, a sane spouse may, as in Crittenden, be
faced with the inability to legally terminate a marriage. To remedy this
problem, many states have provided by statute that insanity is a ground
for divorce.' 7 Until Virginia and other states without such statutes
12. E.g., Wilder v. Wilder, 207 Ark. 414, 181 S.W.2d 17 (1944); Messick v. Messick,
177 Ky. 337, 197 S.W. 792 (1917); Clark v. Clark, 215 La. 835, 41 So. 2d 734 (1949);
Moody v. Moody, 253 N.C. 752, 117 S.E.2d 724 (1961); Camire v. Camire, 43 R.I. 489,
113 A. 748 (1921); Daugherty v. Daugherty, 198 S.W. 985 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
See generally Annot., 19 A.L.R. 2d 144 (1951).
13. E.g., Wilder v. Wilder, 207 Ark. 414, 417, 181 S.W.2d 17, 20 (1944). See also
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-93 (1960) which provides that insanity occurring after the com-
mencement of desertion or abandonment is no defense, and the ground for divorce is
complete at the expiration of one year. See Pollard v. Pollard, 204 Va. 316, 132 S.E.2d
715 (1963). The policy of this statute is to some extent at variance with the Crittenden
case since thete is no voluntary desertion during the entire period.
14. E.g., Wilder v. Wilder, 207 Ark. 414, 417, 181 S.W.2d 17, 20 (1944).
15. E.g., Knabe v. Berman, 234 Ala. 433, 175 So. 354 (1937); Vincent v. LeDoux,
146 La. 144, 83 So. 439 (1918). But see Galiano v. Monteleone, 178 La. 567, 152 So.
126 (1933) and Leveque v. Borns, 174 La. 919, 142 So. 126 (1932) disapproving of
the holding in Vincent v. LeDoux.
16. The following cases discuss various grounds for divorce which are subject to
the defense of insanity. Box v. Box, 253 Ala. 297, 45 So. 2d 157 (1950) (voluntary
abandonment); Vaughn v. Vaughn, 223 Ga. 298, 154 S.E.2d 592 (1967) (cruel treat-
ment); Carlson v. Carlson, 308 111. App. 675, 32 N.E.2d 365 (1941) (extreme cruelty);
Pile v. Pile, 94 Ky. 308, 22 S.W. 215 (1893) (desertion); Hadley v. Hadley, 144 Me.
127, 65 A.2d 8 (1949) (cruelty and abusive treatment); Niedergerke v. Niedergerke,
271 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. App. 1954) (indignities); Bailey v. Bailey, 115 N.J.Eq. 565, 171
A. 797 (1934) (adultery). See generally 18 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 321 (1961); Annot,
19 A.L.R.2d 144 (1951).
17. Approximately thirty states have statutes which provide for insanity as a ground
for divorce. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1522(10) (Supp. 1968); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 403.020 (K) (1963); MD. CODE ANN. art. 16, § 26 (1966); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§50-5(6) (1966); W.VA. CODE ANN. ch. 48, § 48-2-4(8) (Supp. 1969). For a more
comprehensive list of the statutes, see 18 WASH. & LEE L. R~v. 321, 326 n.29 (1961).
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recognize the need for insanity as a ground for divorce, the situation of
the sane spouse, as in Crittenden, undoubtedly will recur.
NICHOLAS JoHN DERomA
Uniform Commercial Code-CASH PAYMENT BY THE PAYOR BANx,
Kirby v. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 210 Va. 88, 168 S.E.2d 27
(1969).
On December 30, 1966 appellant Kirby presented to the appellee
payor bank a check in the amount of $2,500 drawn by Neuse Engineer-
ing and Dredging Co. payable to and endorsed by appellant.1 Appel-
lant maintained an account with the appellee and his deposit ticket
accompanied the check calling for a deposit in currency of $2,300. That
portion of the ticket which provided for the listing of checks deposited
was blank. The teller, as requested, handed the appellant $200 in cash
and on the appellee's next business day the appellant's account was
credited with a deposit of $2,300. An employee of the appellee noted
on the back of the check, "cash for dep." 2
On January 4, 1967, the appellee discovered that the drawer's account
contained insufficient funds to cover the check, and an officer of appellee
phoned the appellant to advise that the appellee had dishonored the
check. Appellant promised to cover the check but did not, and appellee
charged appellant's account with $2,500, creating a $543.47 overdraft.
The appellee then instituted an action to recover. Appealing from a
judgment for the appellee bank, the appellant questioned the bank's right
to charge back the check.3
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the appellee had
no right to charge the appellant's account with the dishonored check.
Finding that the $2,500 had been paid in cash, the court concluded that
the bank had made final payment and could not sue the appellant on the
check, notwithstanding defendant's indorsement and presentment. 4
Traditionally, payment in cash of an item by the payor bank has
constituted final payment and the Uniform Commercial Code has
1. Kirby v. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 210 Va. 88, 168 S..2d 273 (1969).
2. Id. at 88, 168 S.E.2d at 279.
3. Id. at 91, 168 SE.2d at 275.
4. Id. at 92, 168 S.E.2d at 276.
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